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Abstract
To choose a suitable multi-winner rule, i.e., a voting rule for selecting a subset of k
alternatives based on a collection of preferences, is a hard and ambiguous task. Depending on
the context, it varies widely what constitutes the choice of an “optimal” subset. In this paper,
we offer a new perspective to measure the quality of such subsets and—consequently—
multi-winner rules. We provide a quantitative analysis using methods from the theory
of approximation algorithms and estimate how well multi-winner rules approximate two
extreme objectives: diversity as captured by the (Approval) Chamberlin–Courant rule and
individual excellence as captured by Multi-winner Approval Voting. With both theoretical
and experimental methods we classify multi-winner rules in terms of their quantitative
alignment with these two opposing objectives.
1 Introduction
A multi-winner rule is a voting method for selecting a fixed-size subset of alternatives, a
so-called committee. More formally, it is a function that given a set of objects, preferences
of a population of voters over these objects, and an integer k, returns a subset of exactly k
objects. Multi-winner rules are applicable to problems from and beyond the political domain, for
instance to selecting a representative body such as a parliament or university senate [13, 18], to
shortlisting candidates (e.g., in a competition) [6], designing search engines [15, 37] and other
recommendation systems [35], and as mechanisms for locating facilities [19].
Ideally, a multi-winner rule should select the “best” committee, but the suitability of a
chosen committee strongly depends on the specific context. For instance, if voters are experts
(e.g., judges in a sport competition) whose preferences reflect their estimates of the objective
qualities of candidates, then the goal is typically to pick k individually best candidates, e.g.,
those candidates who receive the highest scores from judges. Intuitively and somehow simplified,
in this and similar scenarios the quality of candidates can be assessed separately, and a suitable
multi-winner rule should pick the k best-rated ones. On the contrary, if the voters are citizens
and the goal is to choose locations for k public facilities (say, hospitals), then our goal is very
different: assessing the candidates separately can result in building all the facilities in one densely
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populated area; yet, it is preferable to spread them in order to ensure that as many citizens as
possible have access to some facility in their vicinity.
These two examples illustrate two very different goals of multi-winner rules, which can be
informally described as follows [18]: Diversity requires that a rule should select a committee
which represents as many voters as possible; this translates to choosing a hospital distribution
that covers as many citizens as possible. Individual excellence suggests picking those candidates
that individually receive the highest total support from the voters; this translates to selecting a
group of best contestants in the previous example. However, many real-life scenarios do not
fall clearly into one of the two categories. For example, rankings provided by a search engine
should list the most relevant websites but also provide every user at least one helpful link. In
such cases, a mechanism designer would be interested in choosing a rule that guarantees some
degree of diversity and individual excellence at the same time, putting more emphasis on either
of them depending on the particular context. Consequently, to properly match rules with specific
applications, it is essential to understand to which degree committees chosen by established
multi-winner rules are diverse or individually excellent. In this paper we (1) develop a set of tools
that allow one to better understand the nature of multi-winner rules and to assess the tradeoffs
between their diversity and individual excellence, and (2) provide a classification that clarifies the
behavior of these rules with respect to the two criteria. We focus on the case where voters express
their preferences by providing subsets of approved candidates (the approval-based model), yet
our approach is applicable to other preference models as well.
1.1 Methodology and Contribution
In our approach we identify two multi-winner rules, the Chamberlin–Courant rule (CC) and
Multi-winner Approval Voting (AV), as distinctive representatives of the principles of diversity
and individual excellence, respectively. Next, we measure how close certain rules are to AV and
CC—we measure this distance by using the concept of the worst-case approximation. Thus,
by investigating how well certain rules approximate AV (resp. CC), we provide guarantees of
how individually excellent (resp. diverse) these rules are. Such guarantees could be viewed as
quantitative properties that measure the level of diversity and individual excellence of the studied
rules. This is quite different from the traditional axiomatic approach to investigating properties
of voting rules, which is qualitative: a rule can either satisfy a property or not. Our approach
provides much more fine-grained information and allows us to estimate the degree to which a
certain property is satisfied. With these methods, we understand voting rules as a compromise
between different (often contradictory) goals.
Our main contribution lies in developing a new method for evaluating multi-winner rules.
Specifically, we provide two types of analyses for a number of multi-winner rules:
(1) In Section 3, we derive theoretical upper bounds on how much an outcome of the considered
multi-winner rules can differ from the outcomes of CC and AV. We call these bounds
CC-guarantee and AV-guarantee. These can be interpreted as worst-case (over all possible
preference profiles) guarantees for diversity and individual excellence. Our guarantees are
given as functions of the committee size k and return values between 0 and 1. Intuitively,
a higher CC-guarantee (resp. AV-guarantee) indicates a better performance in terms of
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AV-guarantee CC-guarantee effic.
lower upper lower upper
AV 1 1 1
k
1
k
3
CC 1
k
1
k
1 1 3
seq-CC 1
k
1
k
1− 1/e 1− (1− 1/k)k 7
PAV 1
2+
√
k
2
b√kc − 1k 12 12 + 14k−2 3
p-Geometric W(k log(p))
k log(p)+W(k log(p))
1
k
+ 2W(k log(p))
k log(p)
p−1
p
p
p+ k
k+2
3
seq-PAV 1
2
√
k
2
b√kc − 1k 1log(k)+2 12 + 14k−2 7
α-Monroe 1
k
1
k
1
2
1
2
+ 1
k−1 7
Greedy α-Monr. 1
k
1
k
1
2
1
2
+ 1
k−1 7
seq-Phragme´n 1
5
√
k+1
2
b√kc − 1k 12 12 + 14k−2 7
Table 1: Summary of worst-case guarantees for the considered multi-winner rules. The guarantees
are functions of the committee size k. A higher value means a better guarantee, with 1 denoting
the optimal performance. In most cases we could only find (accurate) estimates instead of
the exact values of the guarantees: the “lower” and “upper” values in the table denote that
the respective guarantee is between these two values. The formulas for the guarantees of the
p-Geometric rule are depicted in Figure 1 (page 11). The column “efficiency” indicates whether
the rule satisfies the efficiency axiom as discussed in Section 5.
diversity (resp. individual excellence), where 1 denotes that the rule performs as good as CC
(resp., AV). Table 1 summarizes our results. We also prove bounds on how well proportional
rules can approximate AV and CC.
(2) In Section 4, we complement the worst-case analysis from Section 3 with an experimental
study yielding approximation ratios for actual data sets. In extensive experiments we estimate
how on average the outcomes of the considered rules differ from the outcomes of CC and
AV.
In Section 5, we complement our results with an analysis of the axiom of efficiency, which
can be viewed as an incarnation of Pareto efficiency, in the context of multi-winner elections. We
say that a committee W1 dominates a committee W2 if each voter approves as many members of
W1 as of W2 and some voter approves strictly more members of W1 than of W2. Efficiency says
that a rule should never select a dominated committee; thus efficiency could be viewed as a basic
axiom for individual excellence. Since efficiency appears to be very fundamental, it may come
as a surprise that many known rules (in particular, the Monroe rule and all sequential rules) do
not satisfy this property. The result of this analysis is also summarized in Table 1.
Our most important findings can be summarized as follows. Proportional Approval Voting
(PAV) achieves the best compromise between AV and CC; this can be observed both from
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theoretical and experimental results. The sequential rules seq-PAV and Phragme´n’s rule, however,
achieve almost the same quality while being polynomial-time computable (in contrast to PAV,
which is computationally intractable [4, 35]). Also the 2-Geometric rule achieves a very good
compromise, but is slightly leaning towards diversity. More generally, we show that the p-
Geometric rule spans the whole spectrum from AV to CC, controlled through the parameter p.
Hence, by adjusting the parameter p, one can obtain any desired compromise between AV and
CC.
1.2 Related Work
The normative study of multi-winner election rules typically focuses on axiomatic analysis. For
approval-based rules a number of axioms describing proportionality have been recently identified
and explored, in particular in the context of the rules that we study in this paper [1, 3, 10, 22,
32, 33, 37]. Similar properties for the ordinal model have been discussed by Dummett [14],
Elkind et al. [17], Aziz et al. [2] and in the original works by Monroe [26] and Chamberlin and
Courant [13]; and for the model with weak preferences by Baumeister et al. [7]. For a survey on
properties of multi-winner rules, with the focus on the ideas of individual excellence, diversity,
and proportionality, we refer the reader to the book chapter by Faliszewski et al. [18].
Another approach to understanding the nature of different multi-winner rules is to analyze
how these rules behave on certain subdomains of preferences, where their behavior is much easier
to interpret, e.g., on two-dimensional geometric preferences [16], on party-list profiles [11],
or on single-peaked and single-crossing domains [2]. Other approaches include analyzing
certain aspects of multi-winner rules in specifically-designed probabilistic models [21,23,30,34],
quantifying regret and distortion in utilitarian models [12], assessing their robustness [9], and
evaluating them based on data collected from surveys [31, 39].
2 Preliminaries
For each t ∈ N, we let [t] = {1, . . . , t}. For a set X , we write S(X) to denote the powerset of
X , i.e., the set of all subsets of X . By Sk(X) we denote the set of all k-element subsets of X .
LetC = {c1, . . . , cm} andN = {1, . . . , n} be sets ofm candidates and n voters, respectively.
Voters reveal their preferences by indicating which candidates they like: by A(i) ⊆ C we denote
the approval set of voter i (that is, the set of candidates that i approves of). For a candidate
c ∈ C, by N(c) ⊆ N we denote the set of voters who approve c. Given a set of candidates
X ⊆ C, we write N(X) to denote the set of voters who approve at least one candidate in
X , that is N(X) = {i ∈ N : X ∩ A(i) 6= ∅}. We call the collection of approval sets
A = (A(1), A(2), . . . , A(n)), one per each voter, an approval profile. We use the symbol A to
represent the set of all possible approval profiles.
We call the elements of Sk(C) size-k committees. Hereinafter, we will always use the symbol
k to represent the desired size of the committee to be elected. An approval-based committee
rule (in short, an ABC rule) is a function R : A × N → S(Sk(C)) that takes as an input an
approval profile and an integer k ∈ N (the required committee size), and returns a set of size-k
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committees.1 Below, we recall the definitions of ABC rules which are the objects of our study.
Multi-winner Approval Voting (AV). This rule selects k candidates which are approved by
most voters. More formally, for a profile A the AV-score of committee W is defined as
scav(A,W ) =
∑
c∈W |N(c)|, and AV selects committees W that maximize scav(A,W ).
Approval Chamberlin–Courant (CC). For a profile A we define the CC-score of a com-
mittee W as sccc(A,W ) =
∑
i∈N min
(
1, |A(i) ∩ W |) = |N(W )|; CC outputs
argmaxW sccc(A,W ). In words, CC aims at finding a committee W such that as many
voters as possible have their representatives in W (a representative of a voter is a candidate
she approves of). The CC rule was first mentioned by Thiele [38], and then introduced in a
more general context by Chamberlin and Courant [13].
Proportional Approval Voting (PAV). This rule selects committees with the highest PAV-
scores, defined as scpav(A,W ) =
∑
i∈N H (|W ∩ A(i)|), where H(t) is the t-th harmonic
number, i.e., H(t) =
∑t
i=1
1/i. By using the harmonic function H(·), voters who already
have more representatives in the committee get less voting power than those with fewer
representatives. While using other concave functions instead of H(·) would give similar
effects, the harmonic function is particularly well justified—it implies a number of appeal-
ing properties of the rule [1], and it allows one to view PAV as an extension of the famous
d’Hondt method [11, 22].
p-Geometric. This rule, introduced by Skowron et al. [35], can be described similarly to
PAV. The difference is that it uses an exponentially decreasing function instead of the
harmonic function to describe the relation between the voting power of individual voters
and the number of their approved representatives in the committee. Formally, for a
given parameter p ≥ 1 the p-geometric rule assigns to each committee W the score
scp-geom(A,W ) =
∑
i∈N
∑|A(i)∩W |
j=1
1
pj
, and picks the committees with the highest scores.
It is easy to see that the 1-geometric rule is simply AV.
Sequential CC/AV/PAV/p-Geometric. For each rule R ∈ {CC,AV,PAV, p-geometric}, we
define its sequential variant, denoted as seq-R, as follows. We start with an empty solution
W = ∅ and in each of the k consecutive steps we add to W a candidate c that maximizes
scR(A,W ∪ {c}), i.e., the candidate that improves the committee’s score most. We break
ties lexicographicly.
Monroe. Monroe’s rule [26], similarly to CC, aims at maximizing the number of voters who
are represented in the elected committee. The difference is that for calculating the score
of a committee, Monroe additionally imposes that each candidate should be responsible
for representing roughly the same number of voters. Formally, a Monroe assignment
of the voters to a committee W is a function φ : N → W such that each candidate
c ∈ W is assigned roughly the same number of voters, i.e., that bn/kc ≤ |φ−1(c)| ≤ dn/ke.
Let Φ(W ) be the set of all possible Monroe assignments to W . The Monroe-score of
1Rules which for some profiles return multiple committees as tied winners are often called irresolute. In practice,
one usually uses some tie-breaking mechanism to single out a winning committee.
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W is defined as scMonroe(A,W ) = maxφ∈Φ(W )
∑
i∈N |A(i) ∩ {φ(i)}|; the rule returns
argmaxW scMonroe(A,W ).
Greedy Monroe [36]. This is a sequential variant of the Monroe’s rule. It proceeds in k steps:
In each step it selects a candidate c and a group G of bn/kc or dn/ke not-yet removed voters2
so that |N(c) ∩G| is maximal; next candidate c is added to the winning committee and
the voters from G are removed from the further consideration.
Phragme´n’s Sequential Rule (seq-Phragme´n). Perhaps the easiest way to define the family of
Phragme´n’s rules [10, 20, 27, 28, 29] is by describing them as load distribution procedures.
We assume that each selected committee member c is associated with one unit of load
that needs to be distributed among those voters who approve c (though it does not have
to be distributed equally). Seq-Phragme´n proceeds in k steps. In each step it selects one
candidate and distributes its load as follows: let `j(i− 1) denote the total load assigned
to voter j just before the i-th step. In the i-th step the rule selects a candidate c and finds
a load distribution {xj : j ∈ N} that satisfies the following three conditions: (1) xj > 0
implies that c ∈ A(j), (2) ∑j∈N xj = 1 (3) the maximum load assigned to a voter,
maxj∈N(`j(i− 1) + xj), is minimized. The new total load assigned to a voter j ∈ N after
the i-th step is `j(i) = `j(i− 1) + xj .
3 Worst-Case Guarantees of Multi-winner Rules
The Chamberlin–Courant Rule and Approval Voting represent two extreme points in the spectrum
of multi-winner rules [11, 16, 18, 22]. Specifically, CC and AV are prime examples of rules
aiming at diversity, and at individual excellence, respectively. For a detailed discussion on these
two principles we refer the reader to the book chapter of Faliszewski et al. [18], but below we
also include a simple example which illustrates the difference between AV and CC. In short, AV
cares about selecting candidates who receive the highest total support from the population of
voters, and CC cares mostly about representing the minorities in the elected committee.
Example 1. Consider a profile where 30 voters approve candidates {c1, c2, c3}, 20 voters
approve {c4, c5, c6}, and 5 voters approve {c7, c8, c9}. Let k = 3. For this profile AV selects
candidates {c1, c2, c3}, while CC selects the committee {c1, c4, c7} (among others).
In this section we analyze the multi-winner rules from Section 2 with respect to how well
they perform in terms of diversity, and individual excellence. In our study we use the established
idea of approximation from computer science, but in a novel way: by estimating how well a
given ruleR approximates CC (resp., AV), we quantify howR performs with respect to diversity
(resp., individual excellence). This differs from the typical use of the idea of approximation
in the following aspects: (1) We do not seek new algorithms approximating a given objective
function as well as possible, but rather analyze how well the existing known rules approximate
given functions (even if it is apparent that better and simpler approximation algorithms exist,
2To be precise, for n = k · bn/kc+ c, the first c groups of voters to be removed have size dn/ke and the remaining
k − c have size bn/kc.
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these algorithms might not share other important properties of the considered rules). (2) We are
not approximating computationally hard rules with rules easier to compute. On contrary, we will
be investigating how computationally hard rules (such as PAV, Monroe, etc.) approximate AV,
which is easy to compute.
Definition 1. Recall that for a profile A, scav(A,W ) and sccc(A,W ) denote the AV-score and
CC-score of committee W , respectively. The AV-guarantee of an ABC rule R is a function
κav : N→ [0, 1] that takes as input an integer k, representing the size of the committee, and is
defined as:
κav(k) = inf
A∈A
minW∈R(A,k) scav(A,W )
maxW∈Sk(C) scav(A,W )
.
Analogously, the CC-guarantee ofR is defined by
κcc(k) = inf
A∈A
minW∈R(A,k) sccc(A,W )
maxW∈Sk(C) sccc(A,W )
.
The AV and CC-guarantees can be viewed as quantitative properties of multi-winner rules.
In comparison with the traditional qualitative approach (analyzing properties which can be either
satisfied or not), a quantitative analysis provides much more fine-grained information regarding
the behavior of a rule with respect to some normative criterion. In the remaining part of this
section we evaluate the previously defined rules against their AV- and CC-guarantees.
3.1 Guarantees for CC and AV
Clearly, the AV-guarantee of Approval Voting and the CC-guarantee of the Chamberlin–Courant
rule are the constant-one function. Below we establish the AV-guarantee of CC and vice versa.
Proposition 1. The CC-guarantee of AV is 1/k.
Proof. Consider an approval profileA, and letWav be an AV-winning committee forA. We know
that Wav contains a candidate who is approved by most voters—let us call such a candidate cmax.
Clearly, it holds that sccc(A,Wav) ≥ |N(cmax)|. Further, for any size-k committee W ⊆ C we
have that sccc(A,W ) ≤ k|N(cmax)|, which proves that the AV-guarantee of CC is at least 1/k. To
see that the guarantee cannot be higher than 1/k consider a family of profiles where the set of
voters can be divided into k disjoint groups: N1, N2, . . . , Nk, with |N1| = x + 1 and |Ni| = x
for i ≥ 2, for some large value x. Assume that m = k2 and that all voters from Ni approve
candidates c(i−1)k+1, c(i−1)k+2, . . . cik. For this profile AV selects committee {c1, . . . ck} with the
CC-score equal to x+ 1. The optimal CC committee is e.g., {c1, ck+1, . . . , ck(k−1)+1}, with the
CC-score equal to kx+ 1.
Proposition 2. The AV-guarantee of CC and sequential CC is 1/k.
Proposition 1 and Proposition 2 give a baseline for our further analysis. In particular,
we would expect that “good” rules implementing a tradeoff between diversity and individual
excellence, should have AV and CC-guarantees better than 1/k.
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We conclude this section by noting that the CC-guarantee of the sequential Chamberlin–
Courant rule is 1− (1− 1/k)k (which approaches 1− 1/e ≈ 0.63 for large k). This is the result
of the fact that sequential CC is a (1− (1− 1/k)k)-approximation algorithm for CC [24].
3.2 An Optimal Proportional Compromise
Next, we examine what are the possible AV- and CC-guarantees that a proportional rule could
achieve. We consider a very weak definition of proportionality, called lower quota. This axiom
is widely used [5] in the context of apportionment methods (which are special cases of approval-
based multi-winner rules) and is strictly weaker than proportionality axioms typically used in
the context of approval-based multiwinner rules (such as extended and proportional justified
representation [1, 32]).
Definition 2. We call a profile A a party-list profile if for each pair of voters i, j ∈ N it holds
that either A(i) ∩ A(j) = ∅ or that A(i) = A(j). For a given committee size k we say that a
group of voters V ⊆ N is `-cohesive, if |V | ≥ n`
k
and
∣∣⋂
i∈V A(i)
∣∣ ≥ `.
An ABC rule R satisfies lower quota if for each party-list profile A, each k ∈ N and each
`-cohesive group of voters V ⊆ N it holds that at least ` members of each winning committee
fromR(A, k) are approved by the members of V .
We obtain the following two upper bounds on the guarantees of proportional rules.
Proposition 3. The AV-guarantee of a rule that satisfies lower quota is at most 2b√kc − 1k .
Proof. Let us fix k, and consider the following approval-based profile A with n = k · x voters
divided into k equal-size groups: N = N1 ∪ . . . ∪ Nk, with |Ni| = x for each i ∈ [k]. All
the voters from the first b√kc groups approve k candidates denoted as x1, . . . , xk. For each
i > b√kc all the voters from Ni approve a single candidate yi.
LetR be a rule that satisfies lower quota. Let W and Wav denote the committees returned by
R and by AV, respectively. Lower quota ensures that yi ∈ W for each i > b
√
kc. Thus,
scav(A,W ) =
(
k − b
√
kc
)
x+ b
√
kc · x · b
√
kc ≤ 2kx− b
√
kcx.
On the other hand, one can observe that Wav = {x1, . . . , xk}, and so scav(A,Wav) = b
√
kc ·x ·k.
As a result we have:
scav(A,W )
scav(A,Wav)
≤ 2kx− b
√
kcx
b√kc · x · k =
2
b√kc −
1
k
.
Proposition 4. The CC-guarantee of a rule that satisfies lower quota is at most 3
4
+ 3
8k−4 .
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3.3 Guarantees for Monroe and Greedy Monroe
Let us turn our attention to the Monroe rule and its greedy variant. Since Monroe is often
considered a proportional rule, as it satisfies proportionality axioms such as proportional justified
representation [32]. Hence, one could expect that in terms of AV and CC-guarantees this rule
is between AV and CC. Surprisingly, this is not the case and in fact it does not offer a better
AV-guarantee than CC.
Proposition 5. The AV-guarantee of Greedy Monroe and Monroe is 1/k.
Proposition 6. The CC-guarantee of Monroe and greedy Monroe is between 1
2
and 1
2
+ 1
k−1 .
3.4 Guarantees for PAV
Let us now move to multi-winner voting systems offering asymptotically better guarantees than
the (greedy) Monroe rule. As we will see, the examination of such rules requires a more complex
combinatorial analysis. We start with Proportional Approval Voting.
Theorem 1. The AV-guarantee of PAV is between 1
2+
√
k
and 2√
k
.
Proof. First, we show that the AV-guarantee of PAV is at least equal to 1
2+
√
k
. Consider an
approval profileA and a PAV-winning committeeWpav; let npav = |N(Wpav)| denote the number
of voters who approve some member of Wpav. For each i ∈ N we set wi = |A(i) ∩Wpav|. Let
Wav be a committee with the highest AV-score. W.l.o.g., we can assume that Wav 6= Wpav. Now,
consider a candidate c ∈ Wav \Wpav with the highest AV-score, and let nc = |N(c)| denote the
number of voters who approve c. If we replace a candidate c′ ∈ Wpav with c, the PAV-score of
Wpav will change by:
∆(c, c′) =
∑
i : c∈A(i)∧c′ /∈A(i)
1
wi + 1
−
∑
i : c′∈A(i)∧c/∈A(i)
1
wi
=
∑
i : c∈A(i)
1
wi + 1
−
∑
i : c′∈A(i)
1
wi
+
∑
i : {c,c′}⊆A(i)
1
wi
− 1
wi + 1
≥
∑
i∈N(c)
1
wi + 1
−
∑
i∈N(c′)
1
wi
.
(1)
Let us now compute the sum:∑
c′∈Wpav
∆(c, c′) =
∑
c′∈Wpav
∑
i∈N(c)
1
wi + 1
−
∑
c′∈Wpav
∑
i∈N(c′)
1
wi
= k
∑
i∈N(c)
1
wi + 1
−
∑
i∈N
∑
c′∈Wpav∩A(i)
1
wi
= k
∑
i∈N(c)
1
wi + 1
− npav
(2)
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We know that for each c′ ∈ W we have ∆(c, c′) ≤ 0, thus k∑i∈N(c) 1wi+1 − npav ≤ 0 and∑
i∈N(c)
1
wi+1
≤ npav
k
. We now use the inequality between harmonic and arithmetic mean to get:
npav
k
≥
∑
i∈N(c)
1
wi + 1
≥ n
2
c∑
i∈N(c)(wi + 1)
=
n2c∑
i∈N(c) wi + nc
.
This can be reformulated as:
knc ≤
npav
(∑
i∈N(c) wi + nc
)
nc
=
npav
∑
i∈N(c) wi
nc
+ npav
Now, let us consider two cases. If npav ≤ nc
√
k, then we observe that:
scav(A,Wav)
scav(A,Wpav)
≤
∑
i∈N wi + knc∑
i∈N wi
= 1 +
knc∑
i∈N wi
≤ 1 +
npav
∑
i∈N(c) wi
nc
+ npav∑
i∈N wi
≤ 2 +
npav
∑
i∈N(c) wi
nc∑
i∈N wi
≤ 2 + npav
nc
≤
√
k + 2.
On the other hand, if npav ≥ nc
√
k, then:
scav(A,Wav)
scav(A,Wpav)
≤
∑
i∈N wi + knc∑
i∈N wi
= 1 +
knc∑
i∈N wi
≤ 1 + knc
npav
≤ 1 +
√
k.
In either case we have that scav(A,Wpav)
scav(A,Wav)
≥ 1
2+
√
k
. This yields the required lower bound.
The fact that the AV-guarantee of PAV is at most equal to 2b√kc− 1k follows from Proposition 3
and the fact that PAV satisfies lower-quota [11].
Theorem 2. The CC-guarantee of PAV is between 1
2
and 1
2
+ 1
4k−2 .
3.5 Guarantees for Sequential PAV
For sequential PAV we can prove qualitatively similar AV-guarantees to the ones for PAV.
Theorem 3. The AV-guarantee of sequential PAV is between 1
2
√
k
and 2b√kc − 1k .
Let us now discuss the CC-guarantee of sequential PAV. One can observe that the construction
for PAV from Theorem 2 also works for sequential PAV, which shows that the CC-guarantee of
seq-PAV is at most equal to 1
2
+ 1
4k−2 . Proposition 7 below establishes a lower bound. In this
case however, the gap between the lower and upper bounds on the CC-guarantee of the rule is
large. Finding a more accurate estimate remains an interesting open question.
Proposition 7. The CC-guarantee of sequential PAV is at least equal to 1
log(k)+2
.
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Figure 1: Visualization of guarantees from Theorem 4 and Theorem 5: AV- and CC-guarantees
for k = 20 and varying p. On each figure the upper and the lower line depict the upper and the
lower bound, respectively, on the appropriate guarantee.
3.6 Guarantees for p-Geometric Rule
The following two theorems estimate the guarantees for the p-geometric rule. These guarantees
are visualized in Figure 1. We can see that p-geometric rules, for p ∈ [1,∞), form a spectrum
connecting AV and CC (with p → 1 we approach AV and with p → ∞ we approach CC):
by adjusting the parameter p one can control the tradeoff between the diversity and individual
excellence of the rule.
Let us recall that W(·) denotes the Lambert W function. For each z it holds that z =
W(z)eW(z). Intuitively, W(·) is a function that asymptotically increases slower than the natural
logarithm log.
Theorem 4. The AV-guarantee of the p-geometric rule is between:
W(k log(p))
k log(p) + W(k log(p))
and
2W(k log(p))
k log(p)
+
1
k
.
Theorem 5. The CC-guarantee of the p-geometric rule is between p−1
p
and p
p+ k
k+2
.
3.7 Guarantees for the Sequential Phragme´n’s Rule
Finally we consider seq-Phragme´n, another rule aimed at achieving proportionality of represen-
tation.
Theorem 6. The AV-guarantee of seq-Phragme´n is between 1
5
√
k+1
and 2b√kc − 1k .
The next theorem shows that the CC-guarantee of seq-Phragme´n is asymptotically equal to 1
2
.
Theorem 7. The CC-guarantee of seq-Phragme´n is between 1
2
and 1
2
+ 1
4k−2 .
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4 Average Guarantees: Experimental Analysis
To complement the theoretical analysis of Section 4, we have run experiments that aim at
assessing AV-ratios and CC-ratios achieved by several voting rules. These two ratios are per-
instance analogues of AV- and CC-guarantee and are defined as follows: Given a voting ruleR
and a profile A, the AV-ratio and the CC-ratio are defined as:
minW∈R(A,k) scav(A,W )
maxW∈Sk(C) scav(A,W )
and
minW∈R(A,k) sccc(A,W )
maxW∈Sk(C) sccc(A,W )
.
In these experiments, we have calculated the AV- and CC-ratios for real-world and randomly
generated profiles and compared them for different voting rules. We have used two data sets:
profiles obtained from preflib.org [25] and profiles generated via an uniform distribution
(see details below).
Datasets. We restricted our attention to profiles where both the AV-ratio of CC and the CC-ratio
of AV is at most 0.9. This excludes profiles where an (almost) perfect compromise between AV
and CC exists. The uniform dataset consists of 500 profiles with 20 candidates and 50 voters,
each. Voters’ approval sets are of size 2–5 (chosen uniformly at random); the approval sets of
a given size are also chosen uniformly at random. Experiments for the uniform dataset use a
committee size of k = 5.
The preflib dataset is based on preferences obtained from preflib.org. Since their
database does not contain approval-based datasets, we extracted approval profiles from ranked
ballots as follows: for each ranked profile and i ∈ {1, . . . , k − 1}, we generated an approval
profile assuming that voters approve all candidates that are ranked in the top i positions. As
before, we excluded profiles that allowed an almost perfect compromise between AV and CC. For
the preflib dataset we considered k ∈ {3, . . . , 7} and obtained a total number of 243 instances.
Results. We considered the following voting rules: AV, CC, seq-CC, PAV, seq-PAV, seq-
Phragme´n, Monroe’s rule, as well as the 1.5-, 2-, and 5-Geometric rule. Our results are displayed
as boxplots in Figure 2 for the preflib dataset and in Figure 3 for the uniform dataset. The top
and bottom of boxes represent the first and third quantiles, the middle red bar shows the median.
The dashed intervals (whiskers) show the range of all values, i.e., the minimum and maximum
AV- or CC-ratio. The results for the preflib and random dataset are largely similar; we comment
on the differences later on.
The main conclusion from the experiments is that the classification obtained from worst-case
analytical bounds also holds in our (average-case) experiments. PAV, seq-PAV, and seq-Phragme´n
perform very well with respect to the AV-ratio, beaten only by 1.5-Geometric and AV itself. This
is mirrored by our theoretical results as only PAV, seq-PAV, and seq-Phragme´n achieve a Θ(1/√k)
AV-guarantee. For the uniform dataset, however, seq-Phragme´n has slightly lower AV-ratios, but
still comparable to PAV and seq-PAV. Also the 2-Geometric rule achieves comparable AV-ratios.
Even better AV-ratios are achieved only by 1.5-Geometric and—by definition—by AV.
Considering the CC-ratio, we see almost optimal performance of seq-CC, Monroe, and
5-Geometric, and good performance of PAV, seq-PAV, seq-Phragme´n, and 2-Geometric. Minor
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Figure 2: Results for the preflib dataset (upper boxplot shows AV-ratios, the lower CC-ratios).
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variations within these groups seem to depend on the chosen dataset. We also observe that
5-Geometric is better than Monroe’s rule and seq-CC according to both criteria.
When looking at the three Geometric rules considered here, we see the transition from AV
to CC as our theoretical findings predict (cf. Figure 1): 1.5-Geometric is close to AV, whereas
5-Geometric resembles CC; 2-Geometric performs very similarly to PAV, slightly favoring
diversity over IE.
Our results indicate that PAV is the best compromise between AV and CC. Yet, seq-PAV,
seq-Phragme´n, and 2-Geometric achieve comparable ratios, and the former two are cheaper to
compute.
5 A Pareto Efficiency Axiom
In this section, we provide a complementary axiomatic analysis concerning individual excellence.
We formulate the axiom of efficiency, a form of Pareto efficiency with respect to the number of
approved candidates in a committee. In other words, this axiom dictates that only committees
can be chosen where a further improvement of the total AV-score implies that the AV-score of
some individual voter is reduced. We analyze our rules with respect to this property, and, maybe
surprisingly, show that many rules do not satisfy this basic axiom.
Definition 3. Consider a committee size k ∈ N, two committees W1,W2 ∈ Sk(C) and an
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Figure 3: Results for the uniform dataset (upper boxplot shows AV-ratios, the lower CC-ratios).
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approval profile A ∈ A. We say that W1 dominates W2 in a A if for each voter i ∈ N we have
that |W1∩A(i)| ≥ |W2∩A(i)|, and if there exists a voter j such that |W1∩A(j)| > |W2∩A(j)|.
An ABC ruleR satisfies efficiency if for each profile A ∈ A and each committee size k there
exists no committee W ∈ Sk(C) that dominates each committee inR(A, k).
We start aith the rather surprising observation that seq-Phragme´n does not satisfy efficiency.
Example 2. Consider the set of 36 voters, and five candidates, c1, . . . , c5. By N(c) we denote
the set of voters who approve c. Assume that:
N(c1) = {1, . . . 20}; N(c2) = {11, . . . 28}; N(c3) = {1, . . . 10, 29, . . . , 36};
N(c4) = {21, . . . 36}; N(c5) = {1, . . . 19}.
The sequential Phragme´n’s rule will select c1 first, c4 second, and c5 third, yet committee
{c1, c4, c5} is dominated by {c1, c2, c3}. This example also works for the Open d’Hondt method,
which can be viewed as another variant of the Phragme´n’s rule [33].
We note that the violation of efficiency is not an artifact of the rule being sequential (and
so, in some sense “suboptimal”). Indeed, consider the optimal Phragme´n’s rule, which is the
variant where the committee members and their associated load distributions are not chosen
sequentially, but rather simultaneously in a single step. Similarly, as in the case of its sequential
counterpart, the goal of the optimal Phragme´n’s rule is to find a committee and an associated
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load distribution that minimizes the load of the voter with the highest load (for more details
on this rule we refer the reader to the work of Brill et al. [10]). The following example shows
that the optimal Phragme´n’s rule does not satisfy efficiency. The same example shows that the
Monroe rule does not satisfy efficiency.
Example 3. Consider 24 voters, and four candidates, c1, . . . , c4, with the following preferences:
N(c1) = {3, . . . 22}; N(c2) = {1, 2, 23, 24};
N(c3) = {2, . . . 12}; N(c4) = {13, . . . 23}.
The optimal Phragme´n’s and the Monroe’s rule would select {c3, c4}, which is dominated
by {c1, c2}.
Greedy Monroe, seq-CC, and seq-PAV do not satisfy efficiency either. Intuitively, this is due
to their sequential nature.
Example 4. Consider the following profile with 20 voters and 4 candidates, where:
N(c1) = {2, . . . 10}; N(c2) = {11, . . . 19};
N(c3) = {6, . . . 15}; N(c4) = {2, 3, 4, 16, 17, 18, 19}.
For this profile and for k = 2 the greedy Monroe rule first picks c3, who is approved by 10
voters, will remove these 10 voters, and will pick c4. However, committee {c3, c4} is dominated
by {c1, c2}. The same example shows that seq-CC and seq-PAV do not satisfy efficiency.
All the remaining rules that we consider satisfy efficiency.
Proposition 8. AV, CC, PAV, and p-geometric satisfy efficiency.
6 Conclusion and Future Work
Our work demonstrates the flow of ideas from theoretical computer science to theoretical
economics, in particular to social choice. We designed new tools that can be used to assess
the level of diversity and individual excellence provided by certain rules. Our results help to
understand the landscape of multiwinner rules, specifically how they behave with respect to two
contradictory goals.
Our work can be extended in several directions. First, we have focused on approval-based
multi-winner rules—a natural next step is to perform a similar analysis for multi-winner rules that
take rankings over candidates as input. Second, we have excluded some interesting voting rules
from our analysis, in particular reverse-sequential PAV [37] and Minimax Approval Voting [8];
it is unclear how they compare to rules considered in this paper. Finally, we have chosen AV
and CC as extreme notions that represent diversity and individual excellence. Another natural
approach would be to take a proportional rule (such as PAV) as a standard and see how well
others rules approximate it.
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A Proofs Omitted from the Main Text
Proposition 2. The AV-guarantee of CC and sequential CC is 1/k.
Proof. For an approval profile A let Wcc and Wav be committees winning according to CC
and AV, respectively. We will first prove that scav(A,Wcc) ≥ scav(A,Wav)k . If it was not the
case, then by the pigeonhole principle, there would exists a candidate c ∈ Wav such that
scav(A,Wcc) < scav(A, {c}). However, this means that a committee that consists of c and any
k− 1 candidates has a higher CC-score than Wcc, a contradiction. Thus, the AV-guarantee of CC
is at least 1/k. For seq-CC, the same argument by contradiction applies as this candidate c would
have been chosen in the first round.
To see that this guarantee cannot be higher than 1/k consider the following profile: assume
there are x voters (x is a large integer) who approve candidates c1, . . . , ck. Further, for each
candidate ck+1, . . . , c2k there is a single voter who approves only her. The CC-winning committee
is {c1, ck+1 . . . , c2k−1} with the AV-score of x + k − 1. However, the AV-score of committee
{c1, . . . ck} is xk, and for large enough x the ratio x+k−1xk can be made arbitrarily close to 1/k.
Proposition 4. The CC-guarantee of a rule that satisfies lower quota is at most 3
4
+ 3
8k−4 .
Proof. LetR be a rule that satisfies lower quota. Consider a profile A with n = 2kx voters for
some x ≥ 1. Each from the first kx voters approves candidates X = {x1, . . . , xk}. The other
voters are divided into k equal-size groups, each approving a different candidate from the set
Y = {y1, . . . , yk}. Lower quota ensures that at least k/2 candidates need to be chosen from X .
Thus, the CC-score of a committee selected by R is at most equal to kx + kx
2
. By selecting
one candidate from X and k − 1 candidates from Y we get a CC-score of 2kx− x. Thus, the
CC-guarantee is at most equal to:
kx+ kx
2
2kx− x =
3k
4k − 2 =
3
4
+
3
8k − 4 .
Proposition 5. The AV-guarantee of Greedy Monroe and Monroe is 1/k.
Proof. First, let us consider the greedy Monroe rule. To see the lower bound of 1/k, let A be an
approval profile and let c¯ denote the candidate who is approved by most voters. For the sake of
clarity we assume that k divides n; the proof can be generalized to hold for arbitrary n. Clearly,
for any committee W it holds that scav(A,W ) ≤ k|N(c¯)|. If |N(c¯)| ≤ nk , then the greedy
Monroe rule in the first step will select c¯. Otherwise, it will select some candidate approved by
at least n
k
voters, and will remove n
k
of them from A. By a similar reasoning we can infer that in
the second step the rule will pick a candidate who is approved by at least min
(
n
k
, |N(c¯)| − n
k
)
voters; and in general, that in the i-th step the rule will pick the candidate who is approved by at
least min
(
n
k
, |N(c¯)| − n(i−1)
k
)
voters. As a result, we infer that number of voters that have at
least one approved candidate in the chosen committee is at least
k∑
i=1
min
(
n
k
, |N(c¯)| − n(i− 1)
k
)
= |N(c¯)|.
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Hence the AV-guarantee of Greedy Monroe is at least 1/k.
To see that the same lower bound holds for the Monroe rule, we distinguish two cases; let W
be a winning committee. If c¯ ∈ W , then scCC(A,W ) ≥ |N(c¯)| and we are done. If c¯ /∈ W and
scCC(A,W ) < |N(c¯)|, then there is a committee with a higher Monroe-score that contains c¯; a
contradiction.
Now, consider the following instance witnessing that the AV-guarantee of Greedy Monroe is
at most 1
k
. Let n = k · (x+ 1) and let A be a profile with n voters. Let W ⊆ C with |W | = k
and c1, . . . , ck /∈ W . We define profile A as follows: we have x voters that approve W ∪ {c1}
and one voter that approves only {c1}, we have x voters that approve W ∪ {c2} and one voter
that approves only {c2}, etc. This defines in total k · (x+ 1) voters. AV selects the committee W
with an AV-score of xk2; Greedy Monroe selects the committee {c1 . . . , ck} with an AV-score of
(x+ 1)k. We have a ratio of (x+1)
xk
, which converges to 1
k
for x→∞. The same instance shows
that the AV-guarantee of the Monroe rule is at most 1
k
.
Proposition 6. The CC-guarantee of Monroe and greedy Monroe is between 1
2
and 1
2
+ 1
k−1 .
Proof. First, for the sake of contradiction let us assume that there exists a profile A where the
CC-guarantee of Greedy Monroe is below 1
2
. Let Wcc and WM be the committees winning in A
according to CC and Greedy Monroe, respectively. Let φ be an assignment of the voters to the
committee members obtained during the construction of WM ; we say that a voter is represented
if it is assigned to a member of WM who she approves of. Since sccc(A,WM) < 12 · sccc(A,Wcc),
by the pigeonhole principle we infer that there exists a candidate c ∈ Wcc \WM who is approved
by x unrepresented voters, where:
x ≥ sccc(A,Wcc)− sccc(A,WM)
k
≥ 2sccc(A,WM)− sccc(A,WM)
k
=
sccc(A,WM)
k
.
Similarly, by the pigeonhole principle we can infer that there exists a candidate c′ ∈ WM who is
represented by at most sccc(A,WM )
k
voters. Thus, Greedy Monroe would select c rather than c′, a
contradiction. A similar argument can be made to show that the CC-guarantee of the Monroe
rule is ≥ 1
2
.
Now, consider the following approval profile. There are 2k + 1 candidates, c1, . . . , c2k+1,
and 2k disjoint equal-size groups of voters, N1, . . . , N2k. For each i ∈ [2k], candidate ci
is approved by all voters from Ni. Candidate c2k+1 is approved by all voters from N1 ∪
. . . ∪ Nk. One of the winning committees according to the Monroe and Greedy Monroe rule
is {c1, . . . , ck−2, ck+1, c2k+1}, which has a CC-score of nk + (k − 1) n2k . On the other hand,{ck+1, . . . , c2k−1, c2k+1} has a CC-score of n − nk . Thus, the CC-guarantee of Monroe and
Greedy Monroe is at most:
n
k
+ n(k−1)
2k
n− n
k
=
k+1
2k
k−1
k
=
k + 1
2k − 2 =
1
2
+
1
k − 1 .
This completes the proof.
Theorem 2. The CC-guarantee of PAV is between 1
2
and 1
2
+ 1
4k−2 .
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Proof. We first prove a lower bound of 1/2 for the CC-guarantee of PAV. Consider an approval-
based profile A and a PAV winning committee Wpav. Similarly as in the proof of Theorem 1, for
each voter i ∈ N we set wi = |A(i) ∩Wpav|. Let Wcc be a committee winning according to the
Chamberlin–Courant rule For each two candidates, c ∈ Wpav and c′ ∈ Wcc, let ∆(c′, c) denote
the change of the PAV-score of Wpav due to replacing c with c′. By Inequality (1), we have:
∆(c′, c) ≥
∑
i∈N(c′)
1
wi + 1
−
∑
i∈N(c)
1
wi
.
Let us now consider an arbitrary bijection τ : Wpav → Wcc, matching members of Wpav with the
members of Wcc. We compute the sum:∑
c∈Wpav
∆(τ(c), c) ≥
∑
c′∈Wcc
∑
i∈N(c′)
1
wi + 1
−
∑
c∈Wpav
∑
i∈N(c)
1
wi
=
∑
i∈N(Wcc)
∑
c′∈Wcc∩A(i)
1
wi + 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥ 1
wi+1
−
∑
i∈N(Wpav)
∑
c∈Wpav∩A(i)
1
wi︸ ︷︷ ︸
=1
≥
∑
i∈N(Wcc)
1
wi + 1
− |N(Wpav)| ≥
∑
i∈N(Wcc)\N(Wpav)
1− |N(Wpav)|
≥ |N(Wcc) \N(Wpav)| − |N(Wpav)|
≥ |N(Wcc)| − |N(Wpav)| − |N(Wpav)|
= |N(Wcc)| − 2|N(Wpav)|.
(3)
Since Wpav is an PAV-optimal committee, we know that for each c ∈ Wpav, it holds that
∆(τ(c), c) ≤ 0. Consequently,∑c∈Wpav ∆(τ(c), c) ≤ 0, and so we get that |NWcc|−2|NWpav | ≤
0, Consequently, we get that |NWpav | ≥ |NWcc |2 , which shows that the CC-guarantee of PAV is at
least equal to 1/2.
Now, we will prove the upper bound using the following construction. Let n, the number
of voters, be divisible by 2k. The set of candidates is X ∪ Y with X = {x1, . . . , xk} and
Y = {y1, . . . , yk}. There are n/2 voters who approve X . Further, for each i ∈ [k], there are n2k
voters who approve candidate yi. All committees that contain at least k − 1 candidates from
X are winning according to PAV, among them X itself. Committee X has a CC-score of n/2.
The optimal CC committee consists of a single candidate from X and (k − 1) candidates from
Y—this would give a CC-score of n
2
+ (k − 1) · n
2k
= n · 2k−1
2k
. Thus, the CC-guarantee of PAV
is at most equal to:
2k
4k − 2 =
1
2
+
1
4k − 2 .
This completes the proof.
Theorem 3. The AV-guarantee of sequential PAV is between 1
2
√
k
and 2b√kc − 1k .
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Proof. Since sequential PAV satisfies lower quota [11], the upper bound of 2b√kc − 1k follows
from Proposition 1. In the remaining part of the proof we will prove the lower-bound.
For k = 1, seq-PAV is AV and hence the Av-guarantee is 1. For k = 2, in the first step the
AV-winner is chosen and hence we have an AV-guarantee for k = 2 is 3
4
≥ 1
2
√
2
. Now assume
that k ≥ 3. Let W (j)pav denote the first j candidates selected by sequential PAV; in particular,
W
(0)
pav = ∅. Let wj denote the candidate selected by sequential PAV in the jth step, thus wj is
the single candidate in the set W (j)pav \W (j−1)pav . Let xi,j = |W (j)pav ∩ A(i)|. Next, let Wav be the
optimal committee according to Approval Voting, and let sav = scav(Wav).
If at some step j of the run of sequential PAV, it happens that the AV-score of W (j)pav, which is∑
i∈N xi,j , is greater or equal than
sav
2
√
k
, then our hypothesis is clearly satisfied. Thus, from now
on, we assume that for each j we have that
∑
i∈N xi,j <
sav
2
√
k
. Also, this means that in each step
there exists a candidate c from Wav \Wpav who is approved by nc ≥ sav−
sav
2
√
k
k
≥ sav
k
(1 − 1
2
√
3
)
voters. Let nc = |N(c)|.
Let ∆pj denote the increase of the PAV-score due to adding wj+1 to W
(j)
pav. Using the
inequality between harmonic and arithmetic mean, we have that:
∆pj =
∑
i∈N(c)
1
xi,j + 1
≥ n
2
c∑
i∈N(c) xi,j + nc
>
n2c
sav
2
√
k
+ nc
≥
(
sav
k
(1− 1
2
√
3
)
)2
sav
2
√
k
+ sav
k
(1− 1
2
√
3
)
≥
(
sav
k
(1− 1
2
√
3
)
)2
sav√
k
(1
2
+ 1√
3
− 1
6
)
=
sav
k
√
k
·
(
1− 1
2
√
3
)2
1
2
+ 1√
3
− 1
6︸ ︷︷ ︸
≈0.56
>
sav
2k
√
k
.
Since this must hold in each step of sequential PAV, we get that the total PAV-score of W (k)pav must
be at least equal to k · sav
2k
√
k
= sav
2
√
k
. Since the AV-score is at least equal to the PAV-score of any
committee, we obtain a contradiction and conclude that scav(A,W
(k)
pav) ≥ sav
2
√
k
.
Proposition 7. The CC-guarantee of sequential PAV is at least equal to 1
log(k)+2
.
Proof. Consider an approval profileA and letWspav andWcc denote the winning committees inA
according to seq-PAV and CC, respectively. Let nspav = sccc(A,Wspav) and ncc = sccc(A,Wcc).
The total PAV-score of Wspav is at most equal to nspavH(k) ≤ nspav(log(k) + 1). Thus, at some
step sequential PAV selected a committee member who improved the PAV-score by at most
nspav(log(k)+1)
k
. On the other hand, by the pigeonhole principle, we know that at each step of
seq-PAV there exists a not-selected candidate whose selection would improve the PAV-score by
at least ncc−nspav
k
. Consequently, we get that
nspav(log(k) + 1)
k
≥ ncc − nspav
k
.
After reformulation we have that nspav ≥ ncclog(k)+2 , which completes the proof.
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Theorem 4. The AV-guarantee of the p-geometric rule is between:
W(k log(p))
k log(p) + W(k log(p))
and
2W(k log(p))
k log(p)
+
1
k
.
Proof. We use the same notation as in the proof of Theorem 1 with a difference that instead of
Wpav (denoting a PAV winning committee) we will use Wp-geom, denoting a committee winning
according to the p-geometric rule. By repeating the reasoning from the proof of Theorem 1
instead of Inequality (2) we would obtain:∑
c′∈Wp-geom
∆(c, c′) = k
∑
i∈N(c)
(
1
p
)wi+1
−
∑
i∈N
∑
c′∈Wpav∩A(i)
(
1
p
)wi
= k
∑
i∈N(c)
(
1
p
)wi+1
−
∑
i∈N
wi
(
1
p
)wi
By using Jensen’s inequality we get that
∑
i∈N(c)
1
nc
·
(
1
p
)wi+1 ≥ (1
p
)∑i∈N(c) wi+nc
nc . Thus:
∑
c′∈Wp-geom
∆(c, c′) = knc
(
1
p
)∑i∈N wi
nc
+1
−
∑
i∈N
wi
(
1
p
)wi
≥ knc
(
1
p
)∑i∈N wi
nc
+1
− 1
p
∑
i∈N
wi
Since we know that
∑
c′∈Wp-geom ∆(c, c
′) ≤ 0, we have that:
1
p
∑
i∈N
wi ≥ knc
(
1
p
)∑i∈N wi
nc
+1
Let us set r = knc∑
i∈N wi
, and observe (similarly as in the proof of Theorem 1) that scav(A,Wav)
scav(A,Wp-geom)
≤
1 + r. We have that p
k
r ≥ r. The equation p kr = r has only one solution, r = k log(p)
W(k log(p))
. This
gives r ≤ k log(p)
W(k log(p))
and proves that the AV-guarantee is at least equal to W(k log(p))
k log(p)+W(k log(p))
.
Now, let us prove the upper bound on the AV-guarantee. Let z = k log(p)
W(k log(p))
; in particular, by
the properties of the Lambert function we have that z = p
k
z . Consider the following instance.
Let x be a large integer so that bx · zc ≈ xz. (Formally, we choose an increasing sequence x¯ so
that zx¯−bzx¯c → 0.) Assume there are bx · zc voters who approve candidates B = {c1, . . . , ck}.
Additionally, for each candidate c ∈ D = {ck+1, . . . , c2k} there are x distinct voters who approve
c. For this instance the p-geometric rule selects at most
⌈
k
z
⌉
members from B: if more candidates
from B were selected, then replacing one candidate from B with a candidate from D would
increase the p-geometric-score by more than
x
p
− bx · zc ·
(
1
p
)d kze+1
>
x
p
− x
p
· z ·
(
1
p
) k
z
=
x
p
− x
p
· z ·
(
1
z
)
= 0,
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a contradiction. Thus, the AV-score of the committee selected by the p-geometric rule would
be smaller than x · z · (1 + k
z
)
+ kx = xz + 2kx. Thus, we get that the AV-guarantee of the
p-geometric rule is at most equal to:
2kx+ xz
xzk
=
1
k
+
2
z
=
1
k
+
2W(k log(p))
k log(p)
.
Theorem 5. The CC-guarantee of the p-geometric rule is between p−1
p
and p
p+ k
k+2
.
Proof. Let A be an approval profile and let Wcc and Wp-geom be two committees winning
according to the Chamberlin–Courant and p-geometric rule, respectively. Let np-geom =
sccc(A,Wp-geom) and ncc = sccc(A,Wcc). We observe that:
scp-geom(A,Wp-geom) ≤ np-geom
(
1
p
+
1
p2
+ . . .
)
≤ np-geom · 1
p
· 1
1− 1
p
and that:
scp-geom(A,Wcc) ≥ ncc · 1
p
.
Consequently, from scp-geom(A,Wp-geom) ≥ scp-geom(A,Wcc) we get that:
np-geom · 1
1− 1
p
≥ p · scp-geom(A,Wp-geom) ≥ p · scp-geom(A,Wcc) ≥ ncc,
which gives the lower bound on the CC-guarantee.
Now, let us prove the upper bound. Fix a rational number p and some large integer x such
that px is integer. First, let k be even with k = 2k′. Let the set of candidates be {x1, . . . , xk} ∪
{y1, . . . , yk′}. There are k′ groups of voters who consists of px voters; in each group voters
approve some two distinct candidates from {x1, . . . , xk}. Additionally, there are k′ groups
consisting of x voters who approve some distinct candidate from {y1, . . . , yk′}. It is easy to see
that for such instances the CC-guarantee is at most equal to k
′px
k′px+k′x =
p
1+p
.
Now, let k be odd with k = 2k′ + 1; the set of candidates is {x1, . . . , x2k′+2} ∪ {y1, . . . , yk′}.
There are k′ + 1 groups of voters who consists of px voters; in each group voters approve some
two distinct candidates from {x1, . . . , x2k′+2}. Additionally, there are k′ groups consisting of x
voters who approve some distinct candidate from {y1, . . . , yk′}. Now, we see that the for such
instances the CC-guarantee is at most equal to
(k′ + 1)px
(k′ + 1)px+ k′x
=
p
p+ 1− 1
k′+1
=
p
p+ 1− 2
k+2
=
p
p+ k
k+2
.
The upper bound for the odd case is larger and hence prevails.
Theorem 6. The AV-guarantee of seq-Phragme´n is between 1
5
√
k+1
and 2b√kc − 1k .
25
Proof. First, we will prove the lower bound of 1
5
√
k+1
. Consider an approval profile A, and
let Wphrag and Wav be committees winning according to seq-Phragme´n and AV, respectively.
W.l.o.g., we assume that Wphrag 6= Wav. For each iteration t we will use the following notation:
(1) Let w(t)phrag be the candidate selected by seq-Phragme´n in the t-th iteration. Further, let w
(t)
av
be a candidate with the highest AV-score in Wav \ {w(1)phrag, . . . , w(t−1)phrag}.
(2) Let n(t)phrag = |N(w(t)phrag)|, and n(t)av = |N(w(t)av )|.
(3) Let `j(t) denote the total load assigned to voter j until t. The maximum load in iteration t is
maxj∈N `j(t).
(4) Let `(t)av denote the total load distributed to the voters from N(w
(t)
av ) until iteration t, and
let m(t)av denote the maximum load assigned to a voter from N(w
(t)
av ) until t, i.e., m
(t)
av =
max
j∈N(w(t)av ) `j(t).
We will use an argument based on a potential function Φ: [0, t] → R, which we maintain
during each iteration of seq-Phragme´n. Let Φ(0) = 0. In iteration t, we increase the potential
function by
(
5
√
k + 1
) · n(t)phrag and decrease it by n(t)av , i.e.,
Φ(t) = Φ(t− 1) + (5√k + 1) · n(t)phrag − n(t)av .
Our goal is to show that Φ(k) ≥ 0. If we know that Φ(k) > 0, we can infer that
k∑
t=1
(
5
√
k + 1
) · n(t)phrag − ∑
c∈Wav
|N(c)| ≥
k∑
t=1
(
5
√
k + 1
) · n(t)phrag − k∑
t=1
n(t)av = Φ(k) ≥ 0.
and hence the AV-guarantee of seq-Phragme´n is lower-bounded by 1
5
√
k+1
.
Let s be the first iteration where `(s)av > 3
√
k; if `(t)av ≤ 3
√
k for all t ∈ [k] then we set
s = k + 1.
First, let us consider iterations t < s and show that Φ(t) ≥ Φ(t − 1) + n(t)phrag · 2
√
k. If
w
(t)
phrag = w
(t)
av , then Φ(t) = Φ(t − 1) +
(
5
√
k
) · n(t)phrag. Let us assume w(t)phrag 6= w(t)av . We first
show that m(t)av ≤ `
(t)
av +1
n
(t)
av
. For the sake of contradiction assume that t is the first iteration after
which m(t)av > `
(t)
av +1
n
(t)
av
. First note that this is only possible if indeed w(t)av 6= w(t)phrag. However, by
selecting w(t)av instead of w
(t)
phrag, it can be ensured that the load does not increase above
`
(t)
av +1
n
(t)
av
, so
seq-Phragme´n would have chosen w(t)av , a contradiction. Next, observe that after w
(t)
phrag has been
selected, the largest load assigned in total to a voter is at least equal to 1/n(t)phrag. Yet, if w
(t)
av were
selected, then the largest total load assigned to a voter would be at most equal to `
(t)
av +1
n
(t)
av
. Thus,
it must hold that `
(t)
av +1
n
(t)
av
≥ 1/n(t)phrag, which is equivalent to n(t)av ≤ n(t)phrag(`(t)av + 1). It follows that
n
(t)
av ≤ n(t)phrag(3
√
k + 1). Consequently, we have that
Φ(t) ≥ Φ(t− 1) +
(
5
√
k + 1
)
· n(t)phrag − n(t)av (4)
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≥
(
5
√
k + 1
)
· n(t)phrag −
(
3
√
k + 1
)
· n(t)phrag = n(t)phrag · 2
√
k. (5)
Now, we bound Φ(s−1). Let w = w(s+1)av , i.e., let w be a candidate with the highest AV-score
contained in Wav \ {w(1)phrag, . . . , w(s)phrag}; let nw = |N(w)|. Here, we divide our reasoning into
the following sequence of claims:
(1) Observe that in step s, a candidate other than w is selected by seq-Phragme´n and selecting
candidate w would increase the maximum load by at most 1/nw. As a consequence, in each
iteration t ≤ s, the maximum load increased by at most 1/nw.
(2) We will show that the following holds: if the maximum load in N(w) increases by at least
2/nw between two iterations t1 and t2 ≤ s, then the AV-score from voters in N(w) increased
between these two iterations by at least nw
2
. Towards a contradiction, assume that this is not
the case, i.e., that between t1 and t2 the maximum load from voter in N(w) increases by at
least 2/nw, and the load of more than nw/2 voters in N(w) does not increase. Without loss of
generality, assume that t2 is the first iteration for which our assumption holds. Then, if in t2
we selected w and distributed its load among these more than nw/2 voters whose load has not
yet increased, then the maximum load would increase by less than 2/nw. This contradicts the
fact that seq-Phragme´n does not choose w (by definition of w).
(3) Let us group the iterations of seq-Phragme´n before s into blocks. The i-th block starts after
the (i− 1)-th block ends (the first block starts with the first iteration). Further, each block
ends right after the first iteration which increases the maximum load assigned to a voter from
N(w) by at least 2/nw since the moment the block has started (thus, the last iterations may
not be part of a block). Thus, in each block the maximum load assigned to a voter from
N(w) increases by at least 2/nw. Since in one step the load can increase by no more than
1/nw, in each block the maximum load assigned to a voter from N(w) increases by at most
2/nw + 1/nw = 3/nw. Consequently, since `(s)av > 3
√
k (and so, by the pigeonhole principle,
some voter from N(w) is assigned the load at least equal to 3
√
k
nw
), until s there are at least√
k blocks. By the previous point, the total AV-score of voters increases in each block by at
least nw/2. Since there are at least
√
k blocks, we have that
s−1∑
t=1
n
(t)
phrag ≥
√
k · nw/2.
By Equation (5), we have that
Φ(s− 1) ≥
√
k · nw/2 · 2
√
k = knw.
By choice of w, candidates not contained in Wphrag are approved by at most nw voters and hence
Φ(k)− Φ(s− 1) ≥ −knw. Hence Φ(k) ≥ 0. This concludes the lower bound proof.
For the upper bound we observe that seq-Phragme´n satisfies the lower quota property [11]
and use Proposition 3. This completes the proof.
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Theorem 7. The CC-guarantee of seq-Phragme´n is between 1
2
and 1
2
+ 1
4k−2 .
Proof. We first prove the lower bound on the CC-guarantee of seq-Phragme´n. Consider an
approval profile A, and let Wphrag be a committee selected by seq-Phragme´n for A; let Wcc be
a committee maximizing the CC-score for A. Further, for each i, 1 ≤ i ≤ k, by W (i)phrag we
denote the first i candidates selected by seq-Phragme´n. We set ncc = |N(Wcc)| and n(i)phrag =
|N(W (i)phrag)|.
We will show by induction that for each i it holds that n(i)phrag ≥ i·ncck+i . For i = 0, the base step
of the induction is trivially satisfied. Now, assume that for some i we have n(i)phrag ≥ i·ncck+i , and
we consider the (i + 1)-th step of seq-Phragme´n. Observe that there exists a not-yet selected
candidate c who is supported by at least
ncc−n(i)phrag
k
voters who do not have yet a representative in
W
(i)
phrag. Consider the following two cases:
Case 1: c is not selected in the (i + 1)-th step. After this step the maximum load assigned to
a voter is at least equal to i+1
n
(i+1)
phrag
, which is the number of chosen candidates divided by
the number of voters that share their load. By selecting c the load would increase to no
more than k
ncc−n(i+1)phrag
. Consequently, we have that k
ncc−n(i+1)phrag
≥ i+1
n
(i+1)
phrag
. This is equivalent to
n
(i+1)
phrag ≥ (i+1)ncck+i+1 .
Case 2: c is selected in the (i+ 1)-th step. Then, n(i+1)phrag ≥ n(i)phrag +
ncc−n(i)phrag
k
. After reformulat-
ing:
ncc − n(i+1)phrag ≤ ncc − n(i)phrag −
ncc − n(i)phrag
k
= (ncc − n(i)phrag) ·
k − 1
k
.
By the inductive assumption we have ncc − n(i)phrag ≤ ncc − nccik+i = ncckk+i and
ncc − n(i+1)phrag ≤
ncck
k + i
· k − 1
k
=
ncc(k − 1)
k + i
.
Consequently,
n
(i+1)
phrag ≥ ncc −
ncc(k − 1)
k + i
=
ncc(i+ 1)
k + i
≥ ncc(i+ 1)
k + i+ 1
.
In both cases the inductive step is satisfied, which shows that our hypothesis holds. In particular,
for i = k, we have that n(k)phrag ≥ kncck+k = ncc2 . This proves the lower bound on the CC-guarantee
of seq-Phragme´n.
For the upper bound we use the same construction and argument as in the proof of Theorem 2.
Proposition 8. AV, CC, PAV, and p-geometric satisfy efficiency.
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Proof. LetR ∈ {AV,CC,PAV, p-geometric}. For the sake of contradiction let us assume that
there exists k ∈ N, profile A ∈ A, and a committee W ∈ Sk(C) such that W dominates each
committee from R(A, k). In particular, this means that W has strictly lower score than some
committee Wopt ∈ R(A, k). Thus, there exists a voter i ∈ N that assigns to Wopt a higher score
than to W . However, this is not possible since for each of the considered rules the score that i
assigns to a committee W ′ is an increasing function of |W ′ ∩ A(i)|, a contradiction.
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